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FISHING AND SELLING 
VICTOR P. GOLDBERG* 
CoNSUMERS are a lot like fish, out there waiting to be hooked. Like most 
images, this one is a caricature of reality. The choice and search effort of 
consumers is suppressed in order to explore the implications of selling 
activity by manufacturers and retailers. In particular, the fishing analogy 
suggests that there is a tendency toward excessive selling activity if 
sellers do not take into account the effects of their activity on the costs of 
their rivals. However, sellers, like fishermen, have an incentive to arrange 
their affairs to mitigate the dissipation of rents. This argument is devel-
oped in Section I. The conclusion that sellers might overspend on selling 
activity appears inconsistent with the observation that increased advertis-
ing frequently results in lower consumer prices; however, it is not. The 
apparent paradox is resolved in Section II. In Section III, some specula-
tions on the relationship between marketing and the destruction of social 
capital are put forth. 
I. OVERFISHING 
The common-pool problem in fishing is well known.' No one has prop-
erty rights in live fish, but by capturing them a fisherman can convert the 
unowned resource into private property. By engaging in fishing activity, a 
fisherman reduces the success rate of his competitors, thereby raising 
their costs. Failure to take this effect into account results in "overfishing." 
That is, in the absence of some institutional response, too many resources 
will be devoted to fishing activity. 
The same argument applies to selling activity. Real resources will be 
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. The paper was written 
while I was a John M. Olin Fellow in Law and Economics at the University of Chicago Law 
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1 See H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The 
Fishery, 62 J. Pol. Econ. 124 (1954); and Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Contract-
ing Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 1005 (1982). 
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used to convert people from potential customers (live fish) into actual 
customers (dead, or at least captured, fish). The customer is ofno value to 
the seller until he is captured. The selling effort of each firm will raise the 
costs of its competitors, and, if the firms fail to take this into account, they 
will collectively overspend on selling. 
The argument depends on the very reasonable assumption that price is 
not the only variable that sellers can manipulate to sell their goods. Only 
in a world of no selling costs would the argument not go through. But that 
is a world we have never known. A manufacturer could not compete by 
moving its product to places where customers are likely to gather (such as 
retail establishments); the manufacturer would simply put goods on the 
loading dock and quote low prices to people who would come and cart the 
goods away. 
It might appear that the overfishing result involves only pecuniary ex-
ternalities. Not so. That appearance is a reflection of the general neglect 
of selling costs by economists. Production costs involve "real" resources 
while selling costs apparently do not. But selling does entail the use of real 
resources. If one producer's increased advertising raises the noise level 
so that a second advertiser must spend additional resources to make its 
message as effective as it was before, then the increased costs are just as 
real as if the first producer had produced soot that impaired the second's 
production process. 
The externality language is misleading. If transactions costs, appropri-
ately defined,2 are zero, and if all rights are costlessly defined and pro-
tected, then there are no externalities. That is just a variant on the Coase 
Theorem. 3 It does not matter if customers have the right to prevent firms 
from attempting to court their favor or if firms have property rights to 
customers. Likewise, even if the fish own themselves, the Coase 
Theorem efficiency result would still hold (although there would be a 
substantial wealth effect!). The overfishing result arises because of an 
implicit assumption that the nonownership of live fish is an inexorable fact 
of life. 
The fishing analogy fails to capture a countervailing effect on the costs 
of rivals. One seller's efforts could result in increased sales for some other 
sellers. Advertising of one manufacturer's widgets can result in increased 
2 See Victor P. Goldberg, Production Functions, Transactions Costs and the New In-
stitutionalism, in Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare 395 (George R. 
Feiwel ed. 1985). 
3 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). Keith B. Leffler, 
The Prohibition of Billboard Advertising: An Economic Analysis of the Metromedia Deci-
sion, 1 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 113 (1982), uses the Coase Theorem in analyzing the effects of a 
particular type of selling cost, billboard advertising. 
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demand for other widget makers as well; a retailer's advertising of a 
particular brand could increase demand for that brand at other retail 
outlets (the familiar free rider problem). 4 If firms fail to take this effect 
into account, there is an incentive to underprovide selling effort. 
The free rider and overfishing problems are, therefore, two sides of the 
same coin. The selling effort of one firm affects the ability of other firms 
to sell. The argument is not, I confess, particularly new. Chamberlin 
presented a variant on it in The Theory of Monopolistic Competition. 5 
Most of the arguments concerning the inefficiency of monopolistic com-
petition implicitly have the overfishing concept at their base. For ex-
ample, it is well known that under spatial competition (which is one 
manifestation of selling effort), if there is no coordination, firms would 
have an incentive to locate inefficiently .6 The overfishing analogy might 
be what laymen have in mind with concepts such as ruinous or destructive 
competition. 
The overfishing result is not the end of the story for the fishermen, nor 
should it be for the sellers. The fishermen have the incentive to seek 
institutional arrangements that enable them to coordinate their behavior 
for their mutual benefit-to mitigate rent dissipation. 7 The institutional 
response need not, of course, be a purely private one. It could entail 
limited government action enforcing agreements or defining and enforcing 
boundaries; or it could entail more extensive government involvement in 
the form of regulation or management of the fishery. Coordination, 
whether public or private, will not necessarily be easy to achieve. There 
will be conflict over the content of the mutually advantageous rules. 8 
Moreover, even if the parties could agree on a set of rules, the rewards for 
deviating from a cooperative strategy would often make enforcement 
difficult and expensive. "Solving" the overfishing problem entails costs-
the cures could be worse than the disease. 9 
Likewise, sellers have incentives to devise mechanisms to avoid the 
4 The Supreme Court recognized the importance of the free rider problem in Continental 
T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
5 Edward Hastings Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition 151-56 (8th ed. 
1962). 
6 See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 Econ. J. 41 (1929). 
7 See Johnson & Libecap, supra note I; and Steven N. S. Cheung, The Structure of a 
Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource, 13 J. Law & Econ. 49 (1970). 
8 See Johnson & Libecap, supra note I; also see Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins. 
Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production. 74 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 87 (1984), on the regulation of common pool problems in oil fields. 
9 See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. Law & 
Econ. I (1969), on the "Nirvana Fallacy"; see also Goldberg, supra note 2. 
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costs associated with their overfishing. Unlike the fishing context, how-
ever, the burden of adaptation does not fall entirely on the sellers. The 
customers can adapt as well. (The fish, I suppose, adapt in a Darwinian 
sense, but we can put that aside.) They can shop intelligently, travel to 
suppliers who engage in little selling effort, and so forth. It is convenient 
to treat much of the shopping behavior as a predetermined parameter, like 
the feeding and migratory habits of the fish. Thus, the propensity to turn 
off commercials and the technology for doing so (such as remote control 
units) can both be treated as given. Nevertheless, it is important to recog-
nize that the costs of overfishing can be reduced by adjustments by the 
customers, either individually or collectively. An individual can avert his 
eyes from a billboard; a government can restrict the number of billboards. 
For sellers, the overfishing result can arise both within brands and 
across brands. Consider first intrabrand overfishing. If the manufacturer 
were vertically integrated into selling, it would internalize all selling costs. 
The seller-employee's efforts would be coordinated by the firm's internal 
governance mechanisms. Thus, if the firm added an additional salesman 
in a territory, it would take into account the additional sales generated by 
that salesman as well as the reduced sales (higher selling costs) of its other 
salesmen in the territory. Instead of full integration, the manufacturer 
could opt for a lesser form of integration-selective distribution. 10 By 
limiting the number of retailers carrying its products and/or restricting the 
dimensions in which the retailers compete, the firm can control the costs 
of overfishing. Territorial restrictions-for example, exclusive territories, 
primary areas of responsibility, location clauses-could be granted to 
retailers licensed to sell the product. Or retailers could be restricted to 
certain classes of customers (for example, nongovernment or small ac-
counts). Restrictions on certain forms of retailer competition (akin to 
restricting or taxing certain inputs into fishing) could alter the marginal 
private selling costs of the retailers, resulting in reduced selling. Vertical 
restrictions, in other words, can be utilized to reduce the amount of 
wasteful selling effort. 11 
This is just the opposite of the standard justification for vertical restric-
tions, namely, that in their absence retailing services would be underpro-
vided because of the free rider problem. It might appear paradoxical at 
first that the same type of restrictions can be used to cope with both the 
overfishing and free rider problems, but it is easy to see why this is true. If 
the manufacturer simply allows all retailers to resell his product on what-
'° Any system in which the manufacturer is concerned about the identity of the resellers 
of his product is a selective distribution system. 
11 For elaboration on this argument, see Victor P. Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, 
Imperfect Pricing, and the Economics of Retailing Services, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 301 (1984). 
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ever terms they choose, a retailer is neither penalized for increasing the 
selling costs of the manufacturer's other retailers nor compensated for the 
benefits it confers on them. The vertical restrictions enable the manufac-
turer to fine tune the reward structure in both instances. 12 
Restraining interbrand overfishing is a more difficult problem. It is less 
likely that a single firm would be in a position to profit from developing an 
institutional arrangement that constrains the overfishing. Trade associa-
tions and other multifirm organizations could serve this role. Manufactur-
ers could utilize a common selling agent. 13 For example, a local retailer 
selling the brands of numerous manufacturers would internalize the costs 
of competitive selling; or a seller could limit the number of buyers with 
which it deals; or a buyer could limit the number of potential bidders for a 
contract. 14 
The emerging professional consensus is that restrictions on intrabrand 
competition are adopted by manufacturers on efficiency grounds. In the 
absence of any plausible cartelization story, the restrictions are presumed 
to enhance the welfare of consumers. The argument can be extended to 
interbrand competition as well. The devices for constraining interbrand 
overfishing also could yield enhanced consumer welfare. The likelihood 
that such devices could also be used to cartelize the industry is, of course, 
much greater in the interbrand case. Nevertheless, it should be clear that 
in a world of positive selling costs (our world) some apparently anticom-
petitive interbrand restraints can have a plausible efficiency rationale. 
That is, perhaps, the next frontier of antitrust revisionism. 
II. THE MARKETING Mix 
The fisherman must make a number of decisions regarding his inputs. 
How many boats of what size and configuration? How should the boats be 
12 There is a close parallel between selling and the production of information. There are 
incentives to free ride on the production of information by others and incentives to "rush to 
invent" if the first producer can privatize the benefits of invention-for example, with 
patents or trade secrets. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent 
System, 20 J. Law & Econ. 265 (1977); and Yoram Barze!, Some Fallacies in the Interpreta-
tion of Information Costs, 20 J. Law & Econ. 291 (1977). 
13 This is a possible economy associated with DeBeers serving as a single selling agent of 
wholesale diamonds; for another explanation of the role of DeBeers, see Yoram Barze!, 
Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25.J. Law & Econ. 27 (1982); and Roy 
W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J. Law & Econ. 497 
(1983). 
14 Kenney and Klein argue that having a prespecified list of buyers can reduce costs; they 
use this argument to explain certain features of the wholesale diamond and motion picture 
industries. See Kenney & Klein, supra note 13. For a discussion of the rewards to limiting 
the number of bidders on a contract, see Victor P. Goldberg, Competitive Bidding and the 
Production of Precontract Information, 8 Bell J. Econ. 250 (1977). 
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manned? And so forth. His incentive to minimize costs is not altered by 
the overfishing problem. It does not follow, of course, that the fisherman 
would use the same technology as he would if the overfishing problem 
were costlessly resolved. Factor productivity would differ in the two 
regimes. Moreover, the devices for coping with the overfishing problem 
might include restrictions on the use of various factors-the size of boats, 
the fineness of the nets, the hours and days of operation, et cetera. The 
individual fisherman would still have the incentive to minimize costs 
given these restrictions. The restrictions would not necessarily be exoge-
nous. If, for example, the resolution of the overfishing problem were by 
voluntary agreement, the choice of the restrictions and the inputs would 
be simultaneous. 15 
The firm's decisions on the appropriate factor mix are, therefore, col-
ored by the overfishing problem. Nevertheless, one can, with reasonable 
caution, make comparative static statements about the factor mix without 
reference to the overfishing complications. Ceteris paribus, if the price of 
boats increases, fishermen would switch to more labor-intensive technol-
ogy. Or if advances in electronics improved the performance of large 
boats more than small ones, there would be a tendency to switch to the 
larger boats. 
The seller of goods also must determine the least-cost combination of 
inputs. The marketing mix might include national and local advertising in 
various media, direct mailing, packaging, and local display and point of 
sale effort. Similar comparative static propositions can be made. Raising 
the price of an input (for example, increasing postage rates on junk mail) 
would result in a switch away from that input. Likewise, technological 
improvements that reduce the costs of using a particular technology 
would result in its increased use. The growth of television, for example, 
reduced the relative cost of national advertising and has resulted in a 
dramatic shift of the marketing mix toward national advertising and away 
from local selling effort by retailers. 
This last observation suggests one way to approach the question: does 
advertising result in increased prices? The answer depends on whether we 
are changing the level of expenditure on marketing or whether we are 
changing the amount of advertising within the marketing mix. If the for-
mer, the chances are much greater that increased advertising would result 
in higher prices. If the increased advertising resulted from a change to a 
more efficient marketing mix, then it is more likely that prices would fall. 
Thus, Steiner found that when toy manufacturers began advertising ex-
tensively on television, they were able to pay retailers a lower gross 
15 See Cheung, supra note 7; and Johnson & Libecap, supra note I. 
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margin to sell them; the increased advertising of toys resulted in a de-
crease in the price level. 16 Similarly, Benham found that lifting the prohib-
ition on advertising of eyeglasses resulted in more advertising and less 
local selling effort, with a net decline in retail prices. 17 
The result is analogous to a reduced wage rate's resulting in a larger 
crew size and a decline in fishing costs. But we cannot conclude that the 
fishing industry as a whole utilizes the efficient amount of labor. That 
depends on the level of fishing effort (the overfishing problem). Likewise, 
we cannot conclude that sellers as a whole allocate the efficient amount of 
resources to advertising by observing their efficient adjustment to 
changes in the relative cost of advertising vis-a-vis alternative marketing 
techniques. 
III. SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Thus far we have presumed that the consequences of the fisherman's 
following his narrowly conceived self-interest are confined to the 
inefficient utilization of the fishery. However, the level of fishing activity 
and the techniques employed can have additional consequences that are 
not taken into account by the fishermen. Overfishing one species, for 
example, might interrupt the food chain and adversely affect the popula-
tion of other species. 18 
There is a parallel to this "ecology" argument in the selling context. 
Suppose that we begin with an equilibrium marketing mix. A new technol-
ogy, telephone solicitation, is then introduced. The technology succeeds 
initially in part because customers had developed "telephone manners" 
that made them likely to listen courteously to a sales presentation. After 
sufficient exposure to such techniques, people might develop defense 
mechanisms (rudeness) that make them less susceptible to telephone 
salesmanship. Such defense mechanisms could have the unfortunate addi-
tional effect of reducing the effectiveness (raising the costs) of other uses 
of the telephone. 
As a second example, consider the pyramid-based retailers. Mr. X 
invites his friends to his house to hear about a great scheme for making 
lots of money by selling the product and by inducing their friends to 
become sellers of the product and the scheme. The success of such sys-
tems (and a number have succeeded) depends on gullibility (suckers, in 
16 Robert L. Steiner, Does Advertising Lower Consumer Prices? J. Marketing, 1973 (No. 
4), at 19. 
17 Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J. Law & Econ. 
337 (1972). 
18 Positive externalities would also, of course, be possible. 
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keeping with the fishing terminology). But it also depends crucially on a 
belief that good friends will not try to defraud each other. Again, people 
will develop defense mechanisms, such as increased skepticism, wari-
ness, and distrust. Such a rational, adaptive response entails the destruc-
tion of "social capital"-trust, civility, et cetera. 
A single seller has no incentive to take account of the effect of his 
marketing innovation on social capital. Moreover, once such social capi-
tal is destroyed it is not easily replaced. The destruction of such social 
capital is at the root of numerous critiques of advertising, marketing, and 
capitalism in general-for example, the writings of John Kenneth Gal-
braith and Vance Packard. 19 I am not suggesting that such critiques are 
either well reasoned or correct. But this argument does help explain why 
these critiques come about and why they often are sympathetically re-
ceived. Moreover, it has implications for the timing of these critiques; 
they will be most favorably received when a marketing innovation is 
causing the rapid destruction of a particular form of social capital. After 
society has adjusted, the criticism will live on primarily in the form of 
nostalgia, a remembrance of elements of civility, lost and probably not 
retrievable. 
19 See, for example, John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (1958); and Vance 
Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (1957); see also Richard M. Titmuss, The Gift Relation-
ship: From Human Blood to Social Policy (1971). 
